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The United Kingdom is one of the few countries in Europe that is not
facing a serious pensions crisis. The reasons for this are straightforward:
Its state pensions (both in terms of the replacement ratio and as a propor-
tion of average earnings) are among the lowest in Europe; it has a long-
standing funded private pension sector; its population is aging less rapidly
than elsewhere in Europe; and it governments have, since the beginning of
the 1980s, taken measures to prevent the development of a pension crisis.
These measures have involved making systematic cuts in unfunded state
pension provisions and increasingly transferring the burden of providing
pensions to the funded private sector. The United Kingdom is not entitled
to be complacent, however, because there remain some serious and unre-
solved problems with private-sector provision.
This paper reviews the current system of pension provision in the
United Kingdom, describes and analyzes defects in the Thatcher-Major
governments’ reforms that brought us to the present system, examines and
assesses the reforms of the Blair government, and then identiﬁes the prob-
lems that remain unresolved and how those problems might be addressed.
The paper ends with an explanation of how the United Kingdom has been
able to introduce changes relatively peacefully when attempts by continen-
tal European countries to reform their pension systems have frequently
led to riots in the streets.
David Blake is professor of ﬁnancial economics and director of the Pensions Institute at
Birkbeck College, University of London.
I am very grateful for useful conversations with my discussant, Andrew A. Samwick.
31710.2 The Current System of Pension Provision
A ﬂat-rate, ﬁrst-tier pension is provided by the state and is known as
the Basic State Pension (BSP). Second-tier or supplementary pensions are
provided by the state, employers, and private-sector ﬁnancial institu-
tions—the so-called three pillars of support in old age. The main choices
are among (1) a state system that oﬀers a pension that is low relative to
average earnings but that is fully indexed to prices after retirement; (2) an
occupational system that oﬀers a relatively high level of pension (partially
indexed to prices after retirement up to a maximum of 5 percent per an-
num), but that, as a result of poor transfer values between schemes on
changing jobs,1 is oﬀered only to workers who spend most of their working
lives with the same company; and (3) a personal pension system that oﬀers
fully portable (and partially indexed) pensions—although these are based
on uncertain investment returns and are subject to very high setup and
administration charges, often-inappropriate sales tactics, and very low
paid-up values if contributions into the plans lapse prematurely.
Employees in the United Kingdom in receipt of earnings subject to Na-
tional Insurance Contributions (NICs) will build up entitlement2 both to
the BSP3 and, on “band earnings” between the Lower Earnings Limit and
the Upper Earnings Limit,4 to the pension provided by the State-Earnings-
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and to its successor from April 2002,
the (ultimately) ﬂat-rate State Second Pension Scheme. These pensions are
paid by the Department of Work and Pensions (as the Department of
Social Security was renamed in June 2001) from State Pension Age, which
is sixty-ﬁve for men and sixty for women.5 The self-employed are also enti-
tled to a BSP, but not to a SERPS pension. Employees with earnings in
excess of the Lower Earnings Limit will automatically be members of
SERPS, unless they belong to an employer’s occupational pension scheme
or to a personal pension scheme that has been contracted-out of SERPS.
In such cases, both the individual and the employer who is contracting-
out receive a rebate on their NICs (1.6 percent of earnings for the em-
ployee and 3.0 percent for the employer, unless it operates a COMPS [see
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1. Blake and Orszag (1997) estimated portability losses of 25–29 percent for typical work-
ers in the United Kingdom, changing jobs an average of six times in a typical career.
2. National Insurance Contributions also build up entitlement to health service, sickness,
disability, and incapacity beneﬁts and the job seeker’s allowance.
3. Worth £67.50 per week for a single person in 2000–01, while national average earnings
were £415 per week, suggesting a replacement ratio of about 16 percent.
4. The Lower Earnings Limit was £67 per week and the Upper Earnings Limit was £535
per week in 2000–01.
5. The State Pension Age for women is being progressively raised to sixty-ﬁve over the
period 2010–20.
6. The non–contracted-out NIC rate in 2000–01 for employees was 10.0 percent of earn-
ings between £76 per week and the Upper Earnings Limit, while for employers it was 12.2
percent on all earnings above £84 per week.below], in which case the employer rebate is 0.6 percent6) and the individ-
ual gives up the right to receive a SERPS pension. However, there is no
obligation on employers to operate their own pension schemes, nor, since
1988, has there been any contractual requirement for an employee to join
the employer’s scheme if it has one.
A wide range of private-sector pension schemes are open to individuals.
One can join his or her employer’s occupational pension scheme (if it has
one), which can be any one of the following:
● Contracted-in salary-related scheme (CISRS)
● Contracted-in money purchase scheme (CIMPS)
● Contracted-out salary-related scheme (COSRS)
● Contracted-out money-purchase scheme (COMPS)
● Contracted-out mixed beneﬁt scheme (COMBS)
● Contracted-out hybrid scheme (COHS)
A CISRS is a deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) scheme that has not been contracted-
out of SERPS and thus provides a salary-related pension in addition to
the SERPS pension. CIMPS provides a deﬁned contribution (DC) supple-
ment to the SERPS pension. COSRS must provide “requisite beneﬁts” in
order to contract out of SERPS—namely, a salary-related pension that is
at least as good as the SERPS pension it replaced, whereas COMPS must
have contributions no lower than the contracted-out rebate. COMBS can
use a mixture of the requisite beneﬁts and minimum contributions tests to
contract out of SERPS; COHS can provide pensions using a combination
of salary-related and money purchase elements. Individuals can also top
oﬀ their schemes with Additional Voluntary Contributions or Free-
Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions, up to limits permitted by
the Inland Revenue.
As an alternative, individuals have the following personal pension
choices that are independent of the employer’s scheme:
● Personal pension scheme
● Group personal pension scheme (GPPS)
● Stakeholder pension scheme (SPS)
A PPS is divided into two components. The ﬁrst is an Appropriate PPS,
which is contracted out of SERPS and provides “protected rights” beneﬁts
that stand in place of SERPS beneﬁts: They are also known as minimum
contribution or rebate-only schemes because the only contributions per-
mitted are the combined rebate on NICs with the employee’s share of the
rebate, grossed for basic rate tax relief (at 22 percent). The second is an
additional scheme, also contracted out, that receives any additional contri-
butions up to Inland Revenue limits. A Group PPS is a scheme that has
been arranged by a small employer with only a few employees. It is essen-
tially a collection of individual schemes, but with lower unit costs because
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holder pension schemes (SPS) are low-cost personal pension schemes in-
troduced in April 2001.
In 1996, the U.K. workforce totaled 28.5 million people, of whom 3.3
million were self-employed (Economic Trends Annual Supplement 1999,
table 3.2). The pension arrangements of these people were as follows (De-
partment of Social Security 1998b, table 1.0; and estimates by the Govern-
ment Actuary’s Department):
● 7.5 million employees in SERPS
● 1.2 million employees in 110,000 contracted-in occupational schemes
● 9.3 million employees in 40,000 contracted-out occupational schemes
(85 percent of such schemes are salary-related, although 85 percent
of new schemes begun in 1998 were money purchase or hybrid)
● 5.5 million employees in personal pension schemes
● 1.7 million employees without a pension scheme apart from the BSP
● 1.5 million self-employed in personal pension schemes
● 1.8 million self-employed without a pension scheme apart from the
BSP
These ﬁgures indicate that 72 percent of supplementary pension scheme
members in 1996 were in SERPS or an occupational scheme and 28 per-
cent were in personal pension schemes.8
Table 10.1 shows the aggregate values of the entitlements9 in the four
key types of pension scheme in 1994. The total value of entitlements in
the BSP and in occupational plans amounted to more than 100 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) each, whereas the value of SERPS and
personal pension plans amounted to 30 percent and 21 percent of GDP,
respectively. Table 10.2 shows the sources of retirement income in 1997–98.
A single person had total retirement income averaging 43 percent of na-
tional average earnings. Nearly two-thirds of this came from state beneﬁts
and another one-fourth from occupational pensions. Personal pensions
provided only about 5 percent of total retirement income for the average
person.10
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7. Private pension schemes in the United Kingdom beneﬁt from an EET system of tax
breaks: the contributions into schemes are exempt from tax, the investment returns (with the
exception, since 1997, of dividend income on U.K. equities) are exempt from tax, and the
pension is taxed (with the exception of a tax-free lump sum equal to 1.5 times the ﬁnal salary
in the case of a DB scheme, and 25 percent of the accumulated pension fund in the case of
a DC scheme).
8. For more details of the U.K. pension system, see Blake (1995, 1997), Fenton, Ham, and
Sabel (1995), Pensions Provision Group (1998), and Reardon (2000).
9. By entitlements I mean either the expected discounted value of accrued rights in DB
schemes (whether funded or unfunded) or the value of accumulated ﬁnancial assets in funded
DC schemes.
10. This is partly because personal pension schemes have been around only since 1988.10.3 The Thatcher-Major Reforms to the Pension System
The Thatcher Conservative government that came into power in 1979
became the ﬁrst government in the Western world to confront head-on the
potential crisis in state pension provision. The reforms were continued by
the succeeding Major government. These governments introduced the fol-
lowing measures:
1. Linked the growth rate in state pensions to prices rather than na-
tional average earnings, thereby saving about 2 percent per annum (Social
Security Act 1980).
2. Raised the state pension age from sixty to sixty-ﬁve for women over
the course of a ten-year period beginning in 2010, thereby reducing the
cost of state pensions by £3 billion per annum (Pensions Act 1995).
3. Reduced the beneﬁts accruing under SERPS (which had been set up
in only 1978) in a number of ways: (a) The pension was to be reduced (over
a ten-year transitional period beginning in April 1999) from 25 percent of
Table 10.2 Sources of Retirement Income in 1997–98
Single Person Married Couples
£ per Percent Percent £ per Percent Percent
Source Week of Total of NAE Week of Total of NAE
State beneﬁtsa 95 64 27 133 44 38
Occupational pensions 33 22 10 90 30 26
Investment incomeb 14 9 4 48 16 14
Earningsc 75 2 3 3 1 1 9
Total 149 100 43 304 100 87
Source: Department of Social Security (2000, table 1).
Note: NAE  national average earnings.
aIncludes Incapacity Beneﬁt, Housing Beneﬁt, Council Tax Beneﬁt, etc.
bIncludes income from personal pensions.
cWomen in the 60–65 age range and men in the 65–70 age range.
Table 10.1 Aggregate Values of Pension Entitlements in 1994
Type of Scheme £billions Percent of GDP
Basic State Pension (BSP) 703 104
State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS) 202 30
Occupational pensions 743 110
Personal pensions 140 21
Source: Blake and Orszag (1999, table 12).
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 321average revalued band earnings over the best twenty years to 20 percent
of average revalued band earnings over the full career (Social Security Act
1986); (b) the spouse’s pension was cut from 100 percent of the member’s
pension to 50 percent from October 2001 (Social Security Act 1986); (c)
the revaluation factor for band earnings was reduced by about 2 percent
per annum (Pensions Act 1995). The combined eﬀect of all these changes
was to reduce the value of SERPS beneﬁts by around two-thirds.
4. Provided a “special bonus” in the form of an extra 2 percent Na-
tional Insurance rebate for all PPSs contracting out of SERPS between
April 1988 and April 1993 (Social Security Act 1986); provided an incen-
tive from April 1993 in the form ofa1p e r c e n ta ge-related National Insur-
ance rebate to members of contracted-out PPSs who were aged thirty or
older, to discourage them from recontracting back into SERPS (Social
Security Act 1993).
5. Relaxed the restriction on PPSs that an annuity had to be purchased
on the retirement date, by introducing an income drawdown facility en-
abling an income (of between 35 and 100 percent of a single life annuity)
to be drawn from the pension fund (which otherwise remains invested in
earning assets) and delaying the obligation to purchase an annuity until
age seventy-ﬁve (Finance Act 1995).
6. Enabled members of occupational pension schemes to join personal
pension schemes (Social Security Act 1986).
7. Simpliﬁed the arrangements for occupational schemes to contract
out of SERPS by abolishing the requirement for occupational schemes
to provide Guaranteed Minimum Pensions (GMPs): since April 1997,
COSRSs had to demonstrate only that they oﬀer requisite beneﬁts that are
broadly equivalent to those obtainable from SERPS (Pensions Act 1995).
8. Ended its commitment to pay for part of the inﬂation indexation of
occupational schemes (Pensions Act 1995). Until April 1997, COSRSs had
to index the GMP up to an inﬂation level of 3 percent per annum, and
any additional pension above the GMP up to an inﬂation level of 5 percent
per annum. Since the GMP replaced the SERPS pension, which was itself
fully indexed to inﬂation, the government increased an individual’s state
pension to compensate for any inﬂation on the GMP above 3 percent per
annum. However, the 1995 act abolished the GMP altogether and required
COSRSs to index the whole of the pension that they pay up to a maximum
of 5 percent per annum.
9. Improved the security of the assets in private-sector schemes through
the creation of a compensation fund operated by the Pensions Compensa-
tion Board, a Minimum Funding Requirement, and a Statement of Invest-
ment Principles (Pensions Act 1995).
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The main defects of the Thatcher-Major reforms were as follows:
1. The removal of the requirement that membership of an occupational
pension scheme could be made a condition of employment. Membership
was made voluntary and new employees had to take the active decision of
joining their employer’s scheme; fewer than 50 percent of them did so.
2. The lack of a requirement to ensure that transferring from an occu-
pational to a personal pension scheme was in the best interests of the
employee, leading directly to the personal pensions misselling scandal that
erupted in December 1993. Between 1988 and 1993, 500,000 members of
occupational pension schemes had transferred their assets to personal
pension schemes following high-pressure sales tactics by agents of PPS
providers. As many as 90 percent of those who transferred had been given
inappropriate advice. Miners, teachers, nurses, and police oﬃcers were
among the main targets of the sales agents. Many of these people remained
working for the same employer, but they switched from a good occupa-
tional pension scheme oﬀering an index-linked pension into a PPS toward
which the employer did not contribute and that took 25 percent of the
transfer value in commissions and administration charges. An example re-
ported in the pressconcerned a miner who transferred to aPPS in 1989 and
retired in 1994 aged sixty. He received a lump sum of £2,576 and a pension
of £734 by his new scheme. Had he remained in his occupational scheme,
he would have received a lump sum of £5,125 and a pension of £1,791. As a
result of a public outcry, PPS providers have had to compensate those who
had been given inappropriate advice to the tune of £11 billion.
3. A lack of restriction on the charges that could be imposed in personal
pension plans, under the hope that market forces alone would ensure that
PPSs were competitively provided.
4. Giving personal pension scheme members the right to recontract
back into SERPS. This option has turned out to be extremely expensive
for the government because of the back-loading of beneﬁts in DB pension
schemes such as SERPS: Beneﬁts accrue more heavily in the later years
than the earlier years.11 Despite the ﬁnancial incentives given to contract
out of SERPS into PPSs, it turned out to be advantageous for men over the
age of forty-two and women over the age of thirty-four to contract back
into SERPSonce the periodof the specialbonus hadended in 1993.To dis-
couragethisfromhappening,thegovernmenthasbeenforcedtooﬀeraddi-
tional age-related rebates to PPS members over age thirty since 1993. Far
from saving the government money, the net cost of PPSs during the ﬁrst ten
years was estimated by the National Audit Oﬃce to be about £10 billion.
11. Although the back-loading eﬀect is lower in average salary schemes (such as SERPS)
than in ﬁnal salary schemes (such as a typical occupational scheme).
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The New Labour Blair government came into power in 1997 with a
radical agenda for reforming the welfare state. During this time, Frank
Field, appointed the ﬁrst Minister for Welfare Reform at the Department
of Social Security (DSS) and charged with the objective of “thinking the
unthinkable,” proved to be too radical for the traditional Old Labour wing
of the Labour Party and was soon replaced. The eventual DSS Green Pa-
per proposals, “A New Contract for Welfare: Partnership in Pensions”
(DSS 1998), turned out to be much less radical than initially anticipated,
but nevertheless continued with the Thatcher government’s agenda of at-
tempting to reduce the cost to the state of public pension provision and
of transferring the burden of provision to the private sector through the
introduction of stakeholder pension schemes. Nevertheless, there was
much greater emphasis on redistributing resources to poorer members of
society than was the case with the Conservatives. Shortly after the publica-
tion of the Green Paper, the treasury issued a consultation document on
the type of investment vehicles in which stakeholder pension contributions
might be invested. I will examine these proposals in turn.
10.4.1 The Department of Social Security Proposals
The key objectives of the DSS Green Paper were to:
1. Reduce the complexity of the U.K. pension system by abolishing
SERPS.
2. Introduce a minimum income guarantee in retirement linked to in-
creases in national average earnings on the grounds that people who work
all their lives should not have to rely on means-tested beneﬁts in retire-
ment; the ﬁrst-tier BSP will remain indexed to prices, however, and over
time will become a relatively unimportant component of most pensions.
3. Provide more state help for those who cannot save for retirement,
such as the low-paid (those on less than half median earnings), the disa-
bled and carers (those who look after children, the disabled, or the elderly
on a voluntary basis), via the unfunded state system.
4. Encourage those who are able to save what they can for retirement,
via aﬀordable and secure second-pillar pensions that are:
a. provided by the state for those on modest incomes (via a new un-
funded state second pension), and
b. provided by the private sector for middle- and high-income earners,
with the option of new low-cost DC stakeholder pensions, which are
likely to replace high-cost personal pensions. However, there will be
no extra compulsion to save for retirement at the second pillar and no
additional incentives over those already existing at the second pillar.
324 David BlakeThe Green Paper proposals formed the basis of the Welfare Reform and
Pensions Act, which received the Royal Assent in November 1999. The
act deals with following issues.
State Pensions
1. A Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) of £75 per week was intro-
duced for pensioners in April 1999; it is means tested and indexed to earn-
ings. In April 2003, the MIG will rise to £100 per week. In the same month,
a pension credit will be introduced with the aim of rewarding thrift by
providing additional cash at the rate of 60 pence for every pound of savings
income, earnings, or second pension. An individual’s total income entitle-
ment will equal the MIG plus 60 percent of the income received from
any second pension, any savings, or any part-time work. The total income
entitlement will be capped at £135 per week.
2. SERPS was replaced by a new State Second Pension Scheme (S2P)
in April 2002. The S2P was initially earnings related, but from April 2007
becomes a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt even though contributions are earnings re-
lated—a feature intended to provide strong incentives for middle- and
high-income earners to contract out. The S2P
a. Ensures that everyone with a complete work record receives com-
bined pensions higher than the MIG;
b. Gives low-paid individuals earning less than £9,500 per annum twice
the SERPS pension given at £9,500 per annum (implying that the
accrual rate is 40 percent of £9,500 rather than the 20 percent un-
der SERPS);
c. Gives a higher beneﬁt than SERPS between £9,500 and £21,600 per
annum (average earnings);
d. Leaves those earning more than £21,600 per annum unaﬀected (with
an accrual rate of 20 percent);
e. Upgrades these thresholds in line with national average earnings; and
f. Provides credits for carers (including parents with children under age
ﬁve) and the disabled.
Stakeholder Pensions
1. New stakeholder pension schemes (SPSs) were introduced in April
2001, but are principally intended for middle-income earners (£9,500–
21,600) with no existing private pension provision. They can be used to
contract out of S2P.
2. They are collective arrangements, provided by:
a. An employer,
b. A representative or a membership or aﬃnity organization, or
c. A ﬁnancial services company.
3. They are DC schemes, with the same restrictions as for personal pen-
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mulated fund may be taken as a tax-free lump sum; the remaining fund
may be used to buy an annuity or to provide a pension income by way
of a drawdown facility until age seventy-ﬁve,12 when an annuity must be
purchased with the remaining assets.
4. They have to meet minimum standards, known as “CAT” (charges-
access-terms) marks concerning:
a. The charging structure and level of charges (a maximum of 1 percent
of fund value),
b. Levels of contractual minimum contributions (£20), and
c. Contribution ﬂexibility and transferability (no penalties if contribu-
tions cease temporarily [for up to ﬁve years] or if the fund is trans-
ferred to another provider).
5. The main provisions of the 1995 Pensions Act apply to SPS, covering
the annual report and accounts, the appointment of professional advisors,
and the Statement of Investment Principles.
6. They are regulated principally by the Occupational Pensions Regula-
tory Authority, with the Pensions Ombudsman for redress and the selling
of schemes and supervision of their investment managers by the Financial
Services Authority.
7. Employers without an occupational scheme and with at least ﬁve
staﬀ members must oﬀer access to one “nominated” SPS and must provide
a payroll deduction facility.
8. There is a new integrated tax regime for all deﬁned contribution pen-
sion plans. SPS, personal pension plans, and occupational DC plans will
attract tax relief on contributions up to a maximum of 17.5 percent of
earnings (below age thirty-six), rising to 40 percent (above age sixty-one).
However, contributions up to £3,600 per annum can be made into any DC
plan regardless of the size of net relevant earnings. Contributions in excess
of £3,600 per annum may continue for up to ﬁve years after relevant earn-
ings have ceased. Thereafter, contributions may not exceed £3,600 per an-
num. All contributions into DC plans will be made net of basic-rate tax,
with providers recovering the tax from the Inland Revenue, and with
higher-rate tax, if any, being recovered in the self-assessment tax return.
Occupational Pensions
1. Occupational schemes can contract out of the S2P.
2. Employers can again make membership of an occupational scheme
a condition of employment, and employees are allowed to opt out only if
they have signed a statement of rights being given up, certiﬁed that they
have adequate alternative provision, and have taken advice that conﬁrms
that the alternative is at least as good as the S2P.
12. There are plans to raise this to age eighty.
326 David Blake3. The compensation scheme established by the 1995 Pensions Act was
extended to cover 100 percent of the liabilities of pensioners and those
within ten years of normal pension age.
Personal Pensions
1. PPS members may contract out of the S2P.
2. They receive protection in cases of the bankruptcy of the member.
10.4.2 HM Treasury Proposals
The treasury proposals were contained in “Helping to Deliver Stake-
holder Pensions: Flexibility in Pension Investment” (HM Treasury 1999).
They called for the introduction of more-ﬂexible investment vehicles for
managing pension contributions, not only those in the new stakeholder
pension schemes, but also those in occupational and personal pension
schemes. These investment vehicles were given the name Pooled Pension
Investments (PPIs). The main PPIs are authorized unit trusts (open-ended
mutual funds), investment trust companies (closed-ended mutual funds),
and open-ended investment companies.
In comparison with the individual arrangements of existing personal
pension schemes and the poor transferability of occupational pension
schemes, PPIs oﬀer:
● Lower charges, because collective investment vehicles have much
lower overheads than individual investments, and
● Greater ﬂexibility, because PPIs are easy to value and transfer be-
tween diﬀerent stakeholder, personal, and occupational pension
schemes. This ﬂexibility allows employees to move jobs without hav-
ing to change pension schemes, and thereby encourage greater labor
market ﬂexibility.
10.5 Assessment of the Blair Reforms
The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act, while containing some signiﬁ-
cant improvements on the existing system, does not fully meet the Green
Paper’s own objectives.
10.5.1 Reforms to State Pensions
Although the abolition of SERPS helped to simplify the United King-
dom’s extremely complex pension system, the proposal to have a MIG (of
£75 per week) that diﬀered from the BSP (£67.50 per week) reintroduced
substantial complexity at the starting point for state pension provision,
especially when the diﬀerence between the two amounts (£7.50 per week)
was initially so small. It would have been far simpler to set the MIG equal
to the BSP and to link the latter to earnings. The government has explicitly
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the high-paid as well as the low-paid, whereas the government’s emphasis
was on helping the low-paid. However, the problem with keeping the BSP
linked to prices rather than to earnings is that it will continue to fall relent-
lessly as a proportion of national average earnings: It is currently only 16
percent of national average earnings and will fall to well below 10 percent
by 2025. Although the government admits that this will save substantial
sums of money, it implies that the government is eﬀectively abandoning the
ﬁrst pillar of support in old age and obliging everyone to rely on the second
and third pillars or on means-tested beneﬁts. The Green Paper talked
about building on the BSP, but this implies building on a sinking ship.
If the government is genuinely concerned about security at the minimum
level for all, it should consider funding the ﬁrst pillar appropriately by
establishing an explicit fund (like the Social Security Trust Fund in the
United States) into which it places the NICs of those who are in work,
while the government itself funds the contributions of the low-paid, carers
and the disabled.14 The contribution rate could be actuarially set to deliver
the MIG for all when they retire. It could be a hypothecated part of NICs.
In other words, the contributions would accrue “interest” equal to the
growth rate in national average earnings. The state could explicitly issue
national average earnings–indexed bonds, which the social security trust
fund would buy. This is the only honest way of both preserving the value
of and honoring the promises under the ﬁrst pillar. The second and third
pillars could then be formally integrated with the ﬁrst pillar; that is, the
second pillar could be used to deliver the tranche of pension between the
MIG and the Inland Revenue limits, while the third pillar is used for volun-
tary arrangements above the Inland Revenue limits. If the ﬁrst pillar re-
mains unfunded, there is nothing to prevent future generations’ reneging
on an agreement that they are expected to keep but into which they did
not voluntarily enter.
The fact that membership of pension schemes at the second pillar re-
mains voluntary is highly worrying for reasons of myopia and moral haz-
ard; compulsory contributions are seen as one way of dealing with these
problems. Myopia arises because individuals do not recognize the need to
make adequate provision for retirement when they are young, but regret
13. An additional £3 billion per year (Daily Telegraph, 31 July 1999).
14. In fact, the Conservative government in the United Kingdom announced in March
1997 plans to privatize the entire state pension system from the turn of the century and to
end its unfunded nature. All individuals in work would receive rebates on their NICs, which
would be invested in personalized pension accounts. The initial costs in terms of additional
taxation were estimated to be £160 million in the ﬁrst year, rising to a peak of £7 billion per
year in 2040. However, the long-term savings to the taxpayer from the end of state pension
provision were estimated to be £40 billion per year (all in 1997 prices). The proposals were
put on hold as a result of the Conservative government’s defeat in the May 1997 General
Election (see Basic Pension Plus, Conservative Central Oﬃce, 5 March 1997).
328 David Blakethis misjudgment when they are old, by which time it is too late to do
anything about it. Moral hazard arises when individuals deliberately avoid
saving for retirement when they are young because they calculate that the
state will feel obliged not to let them live in dire poverty in retirement.
Inevitably, this will lead to substantial means testing in retirement.
In short, although the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act has some good
points, it fails three of Frank Field’s tests for a good state pension system:
It is not mandatory, it is not funded, and it remains means-tested (Field
1996a,b)
10.5.2 Reforms to Private Pensions
The government’s proposal to have a maximum charge of 1 percent of
fund value on SPSs will have two dramatic eﬀects on private-sector pen-
sion provision, especially on PPSs.
TheﬁrstisthatitwillhelptoforceeconomiesofscaleinDCpensionpro-
vision. This is because stakeholder pensions will be a retail product with
wholesale charges. To deliver this product eﬀectively providers will need
to exploit massive economies of scale. The current charges for personal
pension schemes, which average 1.4 percent and rise to as much as 2.2
percent of fund value for twenty-ﬁve-year policies (Money Management,
October 1998); are much higher than the 1 percent CAT-marked limit on
SPS. There may be a range of providers of SPS to begin with, but the only
way for a provider to survive in the long run will be if it operates at low
unit cost on a large scale. This will inevitably lead to mergers among pro-
viders and a ﬁnal equilibrium with a small number of very large providers.
Existing personal pension providers and distribution channels face
these challenges:
● Appropriate PPSs face massive competition from SPSs for future
NIC rebates.
● SPSs could be better than PPSs for middle-income groups, leaving
PPSs as a choice only for those on high incomes who require and are
willing to pay for a bespoke product.
● New, aﬃnity-based SPSs gateway organizations will link up with pen-
sion providers (e.g., Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union,
which has 720,000 members, and Friends Provident).
● The treasury’s proposed PPIs (see section 10.4.2) provide a low-cost
alternative investment vehicle to the high-cost managed funds of
most PPSs.
● Individual Savings Accounts (ISAs), introduced by the treasury in
April 1999 to encourage greater personal-sector saving, also provide
an important alternative to PPSs. Contributions into ISAs of up to
£5,000 per annum are permitted, and the investment returns are free
from income and capital gains tax. Although not intended as pension
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 329saving vehicles (e.g., they do not attract tax relief on contributions,
unlike standard pension saving products), ISAs can be used in retire-
ment income planning because they enjoy the big advantage that they
can be cashed in tax-free at any time, thereby avoiding the need to
purchase a pension annuity on the retirement date.
The second beneﬁt is that it will eﬀectively force stakeholder pension
funds to be managed passively, because active management would result
in a charge higher than 1 percent. As demonstrated below, active fund
managers have not demonstrated that they can systematically deliver the
superior investment performance that justiﬁes their higher charges. Fur-
thermore, passively managed mutual funds (which are similar investment
vehicles to PPIs) in the United States, such as Vanguard, have charges
below 0.3 percent.
10.6 Unresolved Issues in Pension Scheme Design
Led by the United States, there has been an enormous growth in DC
pension provision throughout the world: It seems that private pension pro-
vision in the future will be dominated by DC. The United Kingdom has
had more than a decade of experience with DC provision, and much of
this has been less than satisfactory. Various U.K. governments have at-
tempted to deal with some of the problems that have been identiﬁed, but
many issues have not been resolved. It is worthwhile explaining the key
problems that the United Kingdom has experienced with its DC provision.
10.6.1 The Accumulation Phase of Deﬁned Contribution
Pension Schemes
The investment phase of DC schemes has experienced the following
problems in the United Kingdom.
High and Confusing Charges
The charge structures of most existing personal pension scheme provid-
ers are high, complex, disguised, and front-loaded. Table 10.3 shows that
the average personal pension scheme with a twenty-ﬁve-year investment
horizon takes 19 percent of the fund value in charges, while the worst
scheme takes nearly 30 percent.15 On the one hand, such charge structures
have the eﬀect of confusing consumers to such an extent that they are
unable to assess whether the schemes in which they are being invited to
participate—for a signiﬁcant period of time, and with a substantial com-
mitment of resources—oﬀer value for money. On the other hand, they give
little incentive to the provider to oﬀer value for money on a long-term
basis. An examination of Money Management’s annual Personal Pensions
15. More details on charges in personal pension schemes are contained in Blake and
Board (2000).
330 David Blakepublications (Walford 2000) also reveals that providers change their charge
structures on a regular basis. This makes it very diﬃcult to compare
schemes over time and raises the question as to whether particular charge
structures and changes to them are used to conceal the impact of costs,
and thereby confuse consumers even more.
Furthermore, in order for consumers to compare products, it is impor-
tant that they are aware of the full set of charges they face. It is frequently
the case that some charges are disguised or hidden. One illustration of this
concerns the treatment of paid-up policies (or PUPs; see Slade 1999, who
reports a survey by AXA Sun Life). When policy holders move to a new
pension scheme, they have the choice of taking a transfer value with them
or leaving their assets in the original scheme, which is then converted into
a PUP; the assets cannot be liquidated prior to retirement. Only 15 percent
ofpolicy holderstake transfervalues, whereasthe restleave PUPs.The reg-
ulator requires,however, thatpension schemesdisclose onlytransfer values
and full maturity values. There is no obligation to disclose PUP maturity
values, and, although schemes may do so if they wish, few actually do.
There is clearly a trade-oﬀ between high transfer values and high full
maturity values: Schemes with front-loaded charges will quote low transfer
values and high maturity values relative to schemes with level charges.
Diﬀerent providers compete on the basis of the transfer and full maturity
values that they quote. However, PUP maturity values, which, in principle,
should be related to transfer values, can turn out to be poor value for
money. For example, the AXA Sun Life survey reports the case of one
provider that quotes the highest transfer value among twelve leading pro-
viders, but ranks twelfth for its PUP maturity value quote. It appears that
some schemes quote high transfer values to attract business, knowing that
only 15 percent of those policy holders not going to full term are likely to
Table 10.3 Charges and Reductions in Yield in Personal Pension Plans (%)
5 1 01 52 02 5
Years Years Years Years Years
Charges as a percentage of fund value
Best overalla 3.1 4.1 7.2 8.5 9.8
Best commission-loaded fund 4.0 4.1 7.4 8.9 10.6
Industry average 11.6 13.0 14.8 17.7 19.0
Worst fund 19.2 22.0 24.6 28.2 27.8
Reduction in yield
Best overalla 1.26 0.79 0.90 0.76 0.68
Best commission-loaded fund 1.63 0.79 0.92 0.80 0.73
Industry average 4.91 2.65 1.93 1.68 1.39
Worst fund 8.47 4.76 3.43 2.88 2.16
Source: Money Management (October 1998).
Note: Regular-premium personal pension plan (£200/month).
aLower of best commission-loaded and best commission-free.
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 331take transfers, whereas the remaining 85 percent end up with low PUP
maturity values.
Another example of hidden charges comes from a survey of fund man-
agement fees by Towers Perrin (1998): Some fund managers did not report
their full sets of charges. The three key charges are for asset management,
broking (i.e., transaction execution), and custody. There are also charges
for reporting, accounting, and performance measurement. Some fund
managers report the asset management fee (as some proportion of the
value of the net assets under management) only after deducting the brok-
ing and custody fees. Some fund managers justify this on the grounds that
both the portfolio transactions and the safekeeping are conducted by a
third party independent of the fund manager, typically the global custo-
dian. Other fund managers operate full “clean fees”; that is, they report
full charges, including third party fees that are merely passed through to
the client. Yet other fund managers add commissions to third party fees
before passing them through. In some cases, however, the broker or custo-
dian is related to the fund manager (e.g., is part of the same investment
banking or insurance group). In such cases, it is more diﬃcult to allocate
charges appropriately.
The lack of transparency can also lead to incentive problems. Brokerage
fees are related to turnover, which provides an incentive to churn (i.e.,
overtrade) the portfolio; this is especially so if the transactions are exe-
cuted by an in-house broker and the brokerage fee is hidden from the
client. Some fund managers, in contrast, use discount brokers to reduce
the costs to the clients. Some clients impose turnover limits to reduce costs.
However, the most eﬀective means of keeping charges down is complete
fee transparency, full disclosure for each fund management function, and
benchmark-related performance measurement (where the impact of hid-
den fees is exposed through poor performance).
Low Persistency with Voluntary Arrangements
A regular-premium pension scheme involves a substantial commitment
of time and resources by both the scheme’s sponsor and its members if
the desired objectives are to be achieved. Any signiﬁcant front-loading of
charges in schemes means that members suﬀer substantial detriment if
their contributions lapse prematurely (as the discussion of PUP maturity
values, above, indicates). As the Personal Investment Authority (the prede-
cessor to the Financial Services Authority) argues, “if investors buy poli-
cies on the basis of good advice, they would not normally be expected to
cancel premiums to their policies unless forced to do so by unexpected
changes in their personal circumstances. This means that persistency is a
powerful indicator of the quality of the selling process” (1998, 3).
The Personal Investment Authority shows that persistency rates after
just four years of membership are between 57 and 68 percent (table 10.4).
The persistency rate is higher for schemes arranged by independent ﬁnan-
332 David Blake16. Similar results hold in the United States (see, e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
1992).
cial advisors than by company representatives, suggesting that the clients
of the former are generally more satisﬁed with their policies than those of
the latter. Although only four years of data are available, the evidence
suggests that very few personal pension scheme members (only about 16
percent) are likely to maintain their memberships in the scheme long
enough to build up an adequate pension.
The Personal Investment Authority regards these persistency rates as
“disturbing” (1998, 10) and oﬀers a number of explanations: Members
were missold pensions that were either unsuitable or too expensive; regular
premium policies might be unsuitable for those with irregular earnings or
uncertain long-term employment; a change of employment may lead to a
member’s joining an occupational scheme and abandoning his or her per-
sonal one; adverse general economic conditions could worsen persistency
rates. The Personal Investment Authority also oﬀers suggestions as to why
the IFAs are more successful than company representatives. First, IFAs
tend to advise clients who have higher incomes, and who are more likely
to continue contributing; second, policies chosen by an IFA are likely to
be from a wider range of policies than those oﬀered by representatives of
any single company, leading to a greater likelihood of the policy’s closely
matching the particular needs of the client.
Making membership in second-pillar pension schemes mandatory
rather than voluntary would do much to deal with the problem of low per-
sistency.
Below-Average Investment Performance
Investment performance as well as the costs of delivering that perfor-
mance is critical in DC schemes. Research by Blake, Lehmann, and Tim-
mermann (1999, 2000), Blake and Timmermann (1998), and Lunde, Tim-
mermann, and Blake (1999) has shown the following.16 On average, U.K.
pension funds have underperformed the market in key asset classes (table
Table 10.4 Persistency Rates for Regular-Premium Personal Pension Plans (%)
Company Representatives Independent Financial Advisors
After After After After After After After After
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years
1993 84.1 72.3 63.6 56.7 91.5 83.3 76.6 70.5
1994 83.7 72.8 64.4 91.3 82.1 74.5
1995 85.5 75.0 90.8 81.6
1996 86.6 90.2
Source: Personal Investment Authority (1998, table 1).
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 33310.5), and there has been a wide dispersion of performance by individual
fund managers (table 10.6), with little evidence of funds’ being able to gen-
erate superior (i.e., above average) performance consistently over extended
periods. Poorly performing funds are eventually wound-up or merged into
more successful funds, but it can take many years for this to happen, dur-
ing which time policy holders experience consistently poor returns.
On top of this, the research found that fund managers have not been
especially successful at active fund management. In particular, it found
that 99.47 percent of the total return generated by U.K. fund managers
can be explained by the strategic asset allocation—that is, by the long-run
asset allocation speciﬁed by pension-scheme sponsors on the advice of
their actuaries, following an asset-liability modeling exercise. This is the
passive component of pension fund performance. The active components
are security selection and market timing. The average pension fund was
unsuccessful at market timing, generating a negative contribution to the
total return of –1.64 percent. The average pension fund was, however,
more successful in security selection, making a positive contribution to the
total return of 2.68 percent. The overall contribution from active fund
management, however, was just over 1 percent of the total return (or about
13 basis points per annum), which is less than active fund managers’ annual
fees (which range from 20 basis points for a £500 million fund to 75 basis
points for a £10 million fund; Pensions Management, September 1998).
Virtually the same or better returns could have been generated if pen-
sion funds had invested passively in index funds. In addition, fund man-
Table 10.5 Performance of U.K. Managed Funds in Comparison with the Market, 1986–94
Average Average Average
Portfolio Market Pension Average Percentage
Weight Return Fund Return Outperformance Outperformers
U.K. equities 53.70 13.30 12.97 0.33 44.80
International
equities 19.50 11.11 11.23 0.12 39.80
U.K. bonds 7.60 10.35 10.76 0.41 77.30
International
bonds 2.20 8.64 10.03 1.39 68.80
U.K. index
bonds 2.70 8.22 8.12 0.10 51.70
Cash and other
investments 4.50 9.90 9.01 0.89 59.50
U.K. property 8.90 9.00 9.52 0.52 39.10
Total 100.00 12.18 11.73 0.45 42.80
Sources: Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann (1999, 2000).














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.agement costs would have been lower and the dispersion in returns across
fund managers would have been reduced. Alternatively, if fund managers
believe that, despite all the evidence, they can generate superior investment
performance, they should be willing to accept performance-related invest-
ment management fees that reward good ex post performance and penal-
ize poor ex post performance.
Given the major weaknesses in the existing design of DC pension
schemes in the United Kingdom, the above outcomes at the accumulation
stage of high charges and fund management fees, low persistency of contri-
bution payments, and poor and widely dispersed investment performance
should come as no surprise.
10.6.2 Distribution Phase of Deﬁned Contribution Pension Schemes
Stakeholder pensions are CAT-marked in an attempt to avoid the prob-
lems experienced with personal pensions. However, the CAT-marking ap-
plies only to the accumulation phase, the phase that the scheme member
does not directly experience. Little or nothing has been said about the
distribution phase, when the member discovers whether he or she will re-
ceive a good pension. The distribution phase for U.K. DC schemes in-
volves the purchase of a life annuity. The provision of annuities involve the
following risks.
Adverse Selection and Longevity Risk
This is the risk that the individuals most likely to purchase annuities on
a voluntary basis are those who believe that they are likely to live longer
than the average for the population of the same age. Individuals may have
a good idea, on the basis of both their own personal medical and family
histories, whether they are likely to experience lighter or heavier mortality
than others in the population of similar age. Life insurance companies do
not have access to this information with the same degree of reliability.
The insurance company is unable to diﬀerentiate between prospective
purchasers who will experience heavier mortality (and so make a proﬁt for
the life insurance oﬃce) and those who will experience lighter mortality
(and hence make a loss for the life insurance oﬃce); however, it realizes
that those most likely to purchase annuities will come from the latter group
rather than the former.
To hedge this risk, the life insurance oﬃce will base its annuity rates on
the “select group” that is most likely to purchase annuities. Annuities will
therefore be poor value for the money for members of the ﬁrst group.
Underestimating Increases in Longevity
Longevity tends to increase over time and there can be severe ﬁnancial
consequences if insurance companies underestimate increases in longevity.
Longevity forecast errors of up to 20 percent over intervals as short as ten
years are not uncommon (MacDonald 1996).
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This risk, faced by those purchasing level annuities, is that unantici-
pated high inﬂation rapidly reduces the real value of the pension.
Interest Rate Risk
Annuity rates vary substantially over time. They are related to the yields
on government bonds of the same expected term; and because long-term
yields vary by up to 100 percent, annuity rates will vary by the same order
of magnitude (Credit Suisse First Boston 1999).
Reinvestment Risk
The risk faced by annuity providers that there are insuﬃcient long-
maturing matching assets (especially government bonds) available to make
the annuity payments, with the consequence that the proceeds from matur-
ing assets may have to be reinvested on less favorable terms or in less
suitable assets.
Ineﬃcient Allocation of Risks in Annuities Markets
These risks are currently allocated in the following way: The state as-
sumes interest-rate and inﬂation risk after the annuity is purchased (be-
cause annuity providers purchase ﬁxed-income and index-linked bonds
from the government to generate the cash ﬂows needed to meet their level
and indexed annuity obligations). The annuity provider assumes mortality
risk after the annuity is purchased (because it will incur losses if annuitants
live longer than expected). The annuitant assumes interest rate risk before
the annuity is purchased, and if he or she chooses to buy a level annuity,
inﬂation risk after the annuity is purchased (because the annuitant can
retire at a trough in interest rates and there could be unexpectedly high
inﬂation after he or she takes out a level annuity).
Annuity providers add loadings of 10–14 percent (Finkelstein and Pot-
erba 1999) to cover their costs and risks. Even loadings of this size, how-
ever, may be inadequate to cover the costs of failing to forecast mortality
improvements accurately. Anecdotal evidence suggests that annuity pro-
viders in the United Kingdom have underestimated the life expectancy of
their current annuity pool by about two years. Furthermore, since 1999,
there has been a substantial shortage of new long-maturing government
bonds (both ﬁxed interest and index linked), and this has had the eﬀect of
introducing reinvestment risk into the U.K. annuity market for the ﬁrst
time in its history (Bishop 1999). From the annuitants’ viewpoint, the fall-
ing annuity yields during the 1990s have shown that the interest rate risk
they bear is substantial.
This allocation of risks is not eﬃcient. Annuity providers could do more
to promote products that help annuitants hedge interest rate risk (e.g.,
phased annuities, protected annuity funds in which the interest rate risk is
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 33717. Had the indexation of the BSP been preserved to the growth rate in national average
earnings since 1980, the BSP would have been £95 per week in 1999 rather than £66.75 (Daily
Telegraph, 31 July 1999).
hedged using derivatives, or investment-linked annuities). Similarly, the
state could do more to help annuity providers hedge longevity risk. One
way would be to make supplementary pensions mandatory, thereby bring-
ing the longevity experience of annuitants closer to that of the whole popu-
lation. Another would be to issue new types of bonds, known as Survivor
Bonds (Blake and Burrows 2001). These are life annuity bonds whose cou-
pon payments decline in direct proportion to the rate at which a cohort of
sixty-ﬁve-year-olds on the issue date of the bond dies out, and with the
coupons remaining in payment until this cohort had fully completed its
life cycle. This would enable annuity providers to hedge both aggregate
mortality risks and improvements in mortality, but leave speciﬁc mortality
risks a commercial choice of the provider (e.g., the provider could target
groups with lighter than average mortality [such as nonsmokers] and
charge an additional premium, but that would be a commercial decision).
10.7 The Political Economy of Pension Reform
How has it been possible for U.K. governments to reduce the size of
state pension provision without signiﬁcant political protest, when similar
attempts to do so on the Continent have led to street protests and strikes
(e.g., in Italy in November 1994 and France in November 1995)?
Consider the SERPS pension. When it was ﬁrst introduced in 1978, it
oﬀered a pension of 25 percent of the best twenty years’ band earnings
revalued to the retirement date by increases in NAE, with a 100 percent
spouse’s pension. Within a quarter-century, the value of these beneﬁts had
been reduced by two thirds before the scheme was abandoned altogether.
How has this been achieved so peaceably? There are three main explana-
tions. First, SERPS had been established only a few years before changes
began to be made to it, so very few people were drawing the pension and
little loyalty to the scheme had accumulated. Second, SERPS was an in-
credibly complex pension system that very few pension professionals have
fully understand, let alone members of the general public. Although there
was comment in the media at the time of these changes to SERPS, very
little of it seemed to have permeated the consciousness of the mass of the
population and the extent of the changes was little understood. Third, the
changes were introduced with a lag of ﬁfteen to twenty years, so it was
easy for everyone to forget about them.
Even when changes were introduced immediately, such as the switch in
the uprating of the state pension from earnings to prices, the immediate
diﬀerence was relatively small and most people failed to realize how, over
time, small diﬀerences can compound into large amounts.17
338 David BlakeA ﬁnal explanation lies in the fact that state pension provision is much
less important for most people in the United Kingdom than on the Conti-
nent, and those for whom it is important (namely, the low-paid) have little
political inﬂuence.
The situation on the Continent is rather diﬀerent. State pensions there
provide much higher replacement ratios than in the United Kingdom, and
social solidarity appears to be a more important objective than it is in the
U n i t e dK i n g d o m .A sac o n s e q u e n c e ,i ti sm u c hm o r ed i ﬃcult to alter pen-
sion arrangements on the Continent, even if the political will to do so is
strong—which it clearly is not.
10.8 Conclusion
Over the last twenty years, governments have had two major impacts on
pension provision in the United Kingdom. First, they have reduced the
cost of providing state pensions by reducing the level of beneﬁts from the
state schemes. Second, they have encouraged greater and more eﬀective
private-sector provision, although the Conservative and Labour govern-
ments have done this in quite diﬀerent ways. The Thatcher-Major govern-
ments made private supplementary pension arrangements voluntary and
used tax incentives to encourage consumers to join personal pension
schemes; but they left it to the market to determine the structure and eﬃ-
ciency of these schemes. The result was schemes that exhibited very high
front-loaded charges, because retail customers tend not to be skilled at
assessing the cost-eﬀectiveness of retail ﬁnancial products (Oﬃce of Fair
Trading 1997, 1999). In contrast, the Blair government, recognizing the
market failure arising from poorly informed consumers, imposed restric-
tions on the structure of stakeholder pension schemes that helped to force
economies of scale and hence lower charges.
Charges, however, constitute only one of the issues that must be resolved
with DC pension schemes if such schemes are to provide eﬀective long-
term alternatives to state pensions. Other issues include persistency and
investment performance during the accumulation phase, and longevity, in-
ﬂation, and interest-rate and reinvestment risks during the distribution
phase. With DB schemes, poor portability has been a perennial problem
that neither the Conservative nor the Labour governments have tackled
eﬀectively.
The other countries of Europe would be wise to examine closely the
situation in the United Kingdom, less for the way in which reforms to state
provision were made (because there is no equivalent political will in Eu-
rope to match such reforms) than for the sometimes painful lessons that
were learned in terms of private-sector provision.
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Comment Andrew A. Samwick
The system of public pensions in the United Kingdom is in many ways
unique and, in particular, uniquely complicated to an outside observer.
The author is to be commended for a clear and detailed discussion of what
the U.K. system represents and how it has gotten to that point over the
last twenty-ﬁve years. The main fact about the U.K. system is that it cur-
rently faces a substantially smaller ﬁnancial problem than in other Euro-
pean countries. Less-rapid aging and a smaller pay-as-you-go (PAYGO)
system bode well for the United Kingdom.
This fact tempts us to consider the United Kingdom to be a model for
other European systems that now face ﬁnancial crises. This would be mis-
leading, since the United Kingdom is not in its current position because it
emerged from a past ﬁnancial crisis of the sort the Europe now faces.
Instead, it achieved its enviable position directly, without the transition
that other European countries must soon undertake. The distinction be-
tween the United Kingdom’s being a model, rather than just an example,
is critical in a discussion of the pension crisis now facing Europe. The
general conclusion of my remarks is twofold. First, the system in the
United Kingdom does not give us much guidance about the transition
out of the pension crisis faced by countries with mature PAYGO systems.
Second, the pension system in the United Kingdom is nonetheless quite
informative about some of the pitfalls that may besiege other European
countries once they have found their own ways to more funded systems.
It is not quite right to say that the United Kingdom is ahead of other
European countries. Instead, it beneﬁts from what can be described as a
historical accident or a deliberate policy choice. In the postwar period, the
United Kingdom adopted Beveridge’s plan for public income support, in
Andrew A. Samwick is professor of economics at Dartmouth College and a research asso-
ciate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 341which there was a basic ﬁxed-rate pension set at a subsistence level. Prior
to the implementation of the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme
(SERPS) in 1978, the United Kingdom had no comprehensive system of
publicly funded earnings-related pensions.
As a result of this delay, SERPS has three deﬁning characteristics that
distinguish it from systems in other developed countries. First, SERPS was
not very big, because it had to replace earnings only above the basic state
pension and below an upper earnings limit. Second, it was easily scaled
back in subsequent legislation during the mid-1980s. There were no vested
interests in this system, because it had no large startup generation of pen-
sioners to receive an enormous windfall. In the United States and other
countries that currently have mature PAYGO public systems, there is al-
ways a generation dependent on Social Security for its current income, so
that meaningful reform is politically unlikely (if not impossible) in the ab-
sence of a ﬁnancial crisis. Third, by the time SERPS was established, there
was a very well-developed employer-provided pension sector, and the pub-
lic system was therefore designed to allow contracting out by suitable oc-
cupational and (later) personal pension schemes.
Public pension systems are intended to provide valuable services to their
participants. Apart from issues of beneﬁt levels, which will be discussed
next, there are three economic reasons that countries establish public pen-
sion systems. The ﬁrst is the standard problem of moral hazard. Societies
implicitly, if not explicitly, provide a guarantee against poverty in old age.
This insurance may give households an incentive to consume too much
and to save too little while working. The second is the pooling of longevity
risk. The possibility of slipping into poverty increases with longevity in the
absence of an annuity, even if the moral hazard problem has been ad-
dressed in expected value. Because private annuity markets have always
been incomplete, public systems have primarily paid beneﬁts as indexed
annuities. Making the “purchase” of the annuity mandatory for all bene-
ﬁciaries overcomes the adverse selection problem that exists in private
markets. Third, the goal of relieving poverty is close to uniform across all
members of the population. The cost savings due to economies of scale
in operating a single plan with centralized administration are enormous
compared to the costs of a decentralized system operated by smaller pri-
vate entities.
How well does the U.K. system address the goal of providing poverty
relief among the elderly? This is the primary goal of the Basic State Pen-
sion (BSP), the ﬁrst tier of the system. The BSP is a ﬂat pension of £67.50
per week for a single person, an amount reported to be equal to about 17
percent of national average earnings. The ﬁrst tier has much to recom-
mend it. It is mandatory, centralized, and uniform, so it generates very
little in the way of administrative or selection costs. It is also not very
generous. This has the beneﬁt of not distorting private saving decisions
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too much. However, the BSP seems quite low as a level of income to avoid
poverty. A retiree receiving only the BSP would be eligible for additional
poverty relief programs. Although these other programs may be run in a
more discretionary manner than the BSP, their costs should still be in-
cluded in an assessment of the overall public system to provide retirement
income support.
Additionally, if the BSP does not provide poverty relief, then a case can
be made for expanding it. In many countries, for example, the ﬁrst tier of
beneﬁts is set at the level of the minimum wage. If the ﬁscal costs of ex-
panding the BSP are deemed to be too high for an unfunded system, then
the increase can be phased in gradually, thereby allowing for some pre-
funding of these new liabilities.
Importantly, most workers and beneﬁciaries are not covered by the BSP
alone. Public policy goals typically extend to providing comfortable, more
than just subsistence, levels of income in retirement. Having a comfortable
retirement for most people requires earnings replacement. Furthermore,
there is far more heterogeneity in a condition of comfort than in one of
being “not impoverished.” In particular, it is evident that there is consider-
able variation across households in their preferences to substitute con-
sumption over time, leisure over time, and consumption for leisure during
all periods of time. There is also variation in life-cycle earning experiences.
This heterogeneity makes the need to implement a centrally managed, uni-
form system less imperative. Accommodating this heterogeneity makes the
second-tier or earnings-related beneﬁts far more complicated.
The U.K. system permits real choice in the way participants obtain their
earnings-related beneﬁts. The mechanism is “contracting out” of the state
system (SERPS) on the condition that a privately provided substitute is
available. Contracting out was initially simple, permitting a rebate only
to occupational pension plans with deﬁned beneﬁts (DBs) comparable to
SERPS beneﬁts. It is now more complicated, in order to accommodate
and promote innovation in the private pension sector. A pension can be
eligible for a rebate if it provides similar beneﬁts under a DB plan or uses
the rebate to contribute to a deﬁned contribution (DC) plan. Given the
role played by contracting out, it would be nice to see more detailed infor-
mation on both the time-series and cross-sectional aspects of contracting
out. It is surprising that there not been more research on the economic
eﬀects of contracting out, particularly with respect to saving.1
The debate over social security reform in other European countries and
the United States has included plans that look like a contracting-out re-
bate. In those plans, a new investment-based account is established for
each person, into which a small contribution is made, perhaps 2 percent
of payroll per year. In the future, the private account will replace some of
The United Kingdom: The Switch from Public to Private Pensions 343the beneﬁts that would otherwise be payable from the PAYGO system. If
calibrated correctly, the amount of beneﬁts replaced from the investment-
based account can be enough to alleviate the entire ﬁscal burden that is
generating the ﬁnancial crisis today.2
If this investment account contribution is diverted from the existing
PAYGO tax, then an equal-sized source of revenue must be found if cur-
rent beneﬁciaries of the unfunded system are to be paid. Here is where
the distinctive features of the U.K. system are important. In the United
Kingdom, the contracting-out rebate was not “opting out” of paying the
unfunded liability to past generations. It was entirely prospective—there
were no such past generations. It was not a transition device to solve the
problems currently confronting the rest of Europe or the United States,
and it cannot be used as such in the absence of another revenue source. It
is precisely the diﬃculty of ﬁnding this other revenue source in the political
process—whether it is higher taxes or lower beneﬁts in the pension system
or elsewhere in the government budget—that keeps meaningful reform
from being implemented.
Establishing provisions to allow contracting out was a sensible thing to
do when starting a new system. Initially, these provisions could help keep
costs low because they allowed existing occupational pension schemes to
deliver the beneﬁts that would otherwise have been required of the public
systems. Over time, the system of contracting out has become more com-
plicated in its implementation and underlying economics. In fact, the
United Kingdom is sometimes used as an example of the heavy adminis-
trative costs that would occur if other countries allowed for private-sector
implementation of the second tier of the pension system. The United
Kingdom represents one possible system that mixes public and private
components. Many of the same features exist in the United States in the
part of the retirement system that is implemented through banks and em-
ployers but subsidized by the tax code—for example, Roth and traditional
Individual Retirement Accounts, DB pension plans, DC and 401(k) plans,
and Keogh plans for the self-employed. The amount of choice allowed in
the U.K. system should be thought of as an upper bound on what would
reasonably be expected in the rest of Europe. In other countries, there will
be a greater emphasis on keeping costs low because administrative costs
are in addition to the ﬁscal transition cost.
There is much to learn from the U.K. experience in that regard. Prob-
lems are generally the result of trying to manage a system with elements
of both choice and insurance. Based on the early history of the U.K. exper-
iment, several problems and some solutions can be oﬀered. First, based
on the numbers in the paper, 3.5 out of 28.5 million workers have only the
2. See Samwick (1999) for a complete discussion of the “Two Percent Plan” originally put
forth in Feldstein and Samwick (1998).
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force is left out of the earnings-related system. Combined with the low
level of the BSP, incomplete coverage is a recipe for elderly poverty.
Second, workers could initially contract in and out of SERPS several
times over their working lives. Because SERPS was a DB plan, and DB
plans tend to be back-loaded, the optimal strategy was for workers to con-
tract back into SERPS late in their working lives.3 One way this problem
was addressed was to scale back the generosity of the public system, so
the costs of this type of behavior are lessened. Another was to make the
contracting-out rebate an increasing function of the worker’s age to pre-
vent this from occurring. Perhaps a better way should be established to
prevent these sorts of switches through a longer-term commitment to being
contracted out, or through a greater reliance on DC methods in the state
system.
Third, establishing new administrative structures is costly, especially if
they are organized as private ﬁnancial market institutions in which turn-
over and aggressive selling tend to generate high initial costs. On the ad-
ministrative side, private accounts generate additional transaction costs of
processing payments into and out of the system. These costs can be mini-
mized by relying on existing systems, such as the payroll and income tax
systems, to process payments, perhaps with the assistance of a ﬁnancial
clearinghouse.4 On the investment side, there have been dubious sales
practices and worker confusion in the contracted-out market in the United
Kingdom. Much of this has been due to new problems associated with
widespread private management of DC schemes. Other parts of the prob-
lem relate to the aggressive selling of actively managed mutual funds,
which, as the paper quite clearly shows, are seldom worth the extra man-
agement fees. When ﬁnancial markets are used to achieve social objectives,
and the government is therefore a residual claimant on the ﬁnancial per-
formance of the investments, then more regulation is optimal than may
normally be the case. Limiting the range of investment options (particu-
larly to passively managed funds) and imposing capitalization require-
ments on ﬁnancial intermediaries are some of the ways in which this could
occur. A default plan (like the treasury’s proposed Pooled Pension Invest-
ments, or PPIs) may be useful when allowing choice in social insurance.5
One problem that the United Kingdom avoided was the issue of whether
the ﬁnancial investments should be managed in a central fund or in indi-
3. A pension plan is back-loaded when a disproportionate share of the beneﬁt entitlement
accrues in the later, rather than in the earlier, years of coverage.
4. See Goldberg and Graetz (2000) for a detailed discussion of such a system.
5. A formal plan along these lines is discussed in greater detail in Samwick (1999). A
default plan has three important features. First, it sets the low-fee, low-service standard.
Second, it provides an easy way to set a guarantee that is independent of individual invest-
ment choices. Third, it allows small accounts to incubate for several years before being trans-
ferred to a private ﬁnancial institution.
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never in a position to own private securities directly. Not all countries are
in a position to allow government-administered central funds as part of
their transitions to more funded systems. For example, to close the funding
gap in the United States will eventually require assets of about 60 percent
of gross domestic product. Today, such a fund would be nearly $6 trillion
(see Samwick 1999).
In summary, the current position in the United Kingdom is the result of
favorable demographic and historical conditions. Delaying the introduc-
tion of earnings-related pensions, and then rescinding them shortly after
implementing them, has helped keep the U.K. system out of dire ﬁscal
straits. This is the feature of the public pension system that distinguishes
the United Kingdom from the rest of Europe and the United States. Even-
tually, however, all countries will have to design institutions that blend
insurance and choice in a way that provides poverty relief, earnings re-
placement, and income security for retirees. It is in this respect that the
evolution of public pensions in the United Kingdom can provide guidance
for other countries.
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Discussion Summary
David Blake agreed with the discussant that it was easy to get rid of the
SERPS scheme because it had only just begun. Blake noted that the his-
tory of the United Kingdom in terms of social welfare protection is based
on the Beveridge principle: maintaining the minimum safety net and giving
the public responsibility for providing above that minimum safety net. The
basic state pension does provide an extremely low pension in retirement,
and it is not intended to provide a comfortable standard of living during
retirement. Individuals without other resources would be able to receive
additional welfare beneﬁts, such as housing beneﬁts or municipal tax relief.
346 David BlakeLaurence J. Kotlikoﬀ said that the speaker has done a great service in
making clear the workings of the British pension system. In the view of
Kotlikoﬀ, the British pension reform (of introducing personal pension
plans with their high charges) has generated an unmitigated disaster, with
many people ending up with much lower pensions than if they had re-
mained in their occupational plans and turning to the government for re-
dress. As an alternative, he referred to a joint proposal for the United
States by Kotlikoﬀ, Sachs, and sixty-ﬁve other economists to put a portion
of payroll tax contributions into private accounts with a matching contri-
bution provided by the government on a progressive basis. These accounts
are invested passively in a global index fund to provide an inﬂation-
indexed pension. This proposal would lead to a collective low-cost pension
system in which everyone gets the same return. Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan, re-
sponding to the Kotlikoﬀ proposal, expressed his doubts that an index
fund that carries about 64 percent of GDP can be passively managed.
David A. Wise asked about the diﬀerence between the United Kingdom
and the United States concerning the institutional structure of personal
pension plans. There is no evidence of high charges or fraud in the United
States as are described in the paper for the United Kingdom. David Blake
explained this diﬀerence between the countries by pointing out the diﬀer-
ent degrees of ﬁnancial literacy among consumers. However, he regarded
it unfair to speak of fraud. Instead, the problems in the United Kingdom
are very high eﬀective charges, which are disguised in the marketing litera-
ture. He said that British consumers lack the ﬁnancial sophistication to
make long-term decisions of this kind.
Axel Bo ¨rsch-Supan noted that the contracting-out rebate is essentially a
subsidy that leads to a signiﬁcant ﬁscal burden. According to David Blake,
the ﬁscal burden comes from the fact that the government must keep in-
creasing national insurance rebate to discourage people from contracting
back into SERPS.
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